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RECENT DECISIONS
CONFLICT OF LAws-DoMESTIC RELATIONS-FOREIGN DIVORCE
-JURISDICTION.-A wife leaving the matrimonial domicil in Massa-

chusetts claimed to have acquired a Florida domicil and instituted a
divorce suit there. The husband, on receiving notice by mail of the
pendency of the suit, retained Florida counsel, who entered a general
appearance and filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint, including those as to complainant's domicil. The husband appeared personally to testify with respect to custody of the children.
The wife introduced evidence to establish her Florida residence and
counsel for the husband failed to cross-examine or introduce evidence
in rebuttal. The Florida court entered a decree of divorce in favor
of the wife after specifically finding that she was a bona fide resident
of that state and that the court had jurisdiction of the parties and the
subject matter. The husband subsequently instituted an action in
Massachusetts to declare the wife's divorce and subsequent marriage
invalid. It appeared that she had resided in Florida slightly more
than ninety days before filing for the divorce and later had returned
to Massachusetts with a new husband. Judgment was in favor of
the husband and the defendant wife appeals. Held, judgment reversed. Massachusetts had failed to accord full faith and credit to a
decree of divorce rendered by the court of a sister state; the requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant from collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in the courts of a
sister state where there has been participation by the defendant in the
divorce proceedings, where the defendant has been afforded full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues, and where the decree
is not susceptible to such collateral attack in the courts of the state
which rendered the decree. Sherrer v. Sherrer, - U. S. -, 92
L. ed. 1055 (1948).
The Supreme Court simplified the law on interstate divorce by
precluding the parties to the foreign action from attacking the decree,
where both bad appeared and opportunity was had for contesting
the jurisdictional issue. In doing so it confirmed the dicta of the
first Williams' case which implied that the foreign decree would not
be subject to collateral attack and must be recognized under the "full
faith and credit clause" of the Constitution, 2 where both parties have
1 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 .U. S. 287, 87 L. ed. 279 (1942).

2 U. S. CONsT. Art. IV, § 1 provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof."
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appeared in the litigation. 3 The recognition of foreign divorce decrees has followed a devious path. Williams v. North Carolina 4
compelled the recognition of a foreign divorce if the petitioner was
domiciled in the state granting the divorce, without regard to the fact
that jurisdiction over the other party was obtained by substituted
service. 5 The second Williams 6 case then held that the state of domiciliary origin should not be bound by a recital of a jurisdictional fact
such as domicil where that issue was not squarely litigated in a truly
adversary proceeding. For internal purposes, the position is taken
in most jurisdictions that not only is domicil the basis of jurisdiction
but, in addition, the domicil of one spouse alone is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction to divorce ex parte.7 However, not all state courts have
been as generous in conceding the existence of jurisdiction abroad
under the same conditions as those which are regarded as sufficient
when jurisdiction is claimed at home.8 The New York courts have
been reluctant to give full faith and credit to divorce decrees granted
by the courts of sister states. 9 The diversity of opinion concerning
the importance of domicil in determining jurisdiction results from
traditional concepts and notions of expediency and local statutory
policy with respect to divorce.' 0 The conclusion in the instant case
appears to be a spoke in the wheel which is rolling toward greater
restriction of states' power over divorce law through the instrument
of the "full faith and credit clause." However, the issue unanswered in this decision is whether a state is also precluded from col-

3 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 297, 87 L. ed. 279, 285 (1942).
The court acknowledged that the plaintiff's domicil in a state "is recognized in
the Haddock case and elsewhere . . . as essential in order to give the court
jurisdiction which will entitle the divorce decree to extraterritorial effect, at
least when the defendant has neither been personally served nor entered an
appearance."
4 Supra note 1.
5 Thus overruling the doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 50
L. ed. 867 (1906), which held that the domiciliary state of a defendant who
did not appear personally before the court, need not recognize the foreign decree. It also did away with the need of the doctrine laid down in Atherton
v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, 45 L. ed. 794 (1901), which made the recognition
of the foreign decree upon substituted service compulsory if it was rendered
by the courts of the last matrimonial domicil, that is, of the state in which
the parties last lived together as husband and wife.
6 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 89 L. ed. 1577 (1944).
7 See Note, 39 A. L. R. 710 (1924).
8 Arrington v. Arrington 102 N. C. 491, 9 S. E. 200 (1889); McCreery
v. Davis, 44 S.C. 195, 22 S. h. 178 (1895).
9 People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78 (1879); De Meli v. De Meli, 120 N. Y.
485, 24 N. E. 996 (1890). See also Atherton v. Atherton, 155 N. Y. 129, 49
N. E. 933 (1898).
10 South Carolina would be more reluctant to recognize as valid a divorce
involving a citizen of that state than would the courts of a state where divorce
is relatively easy to obtain. See Ackerman v. Ackerman, 200 N. Y. 72, 93
N. E. 192 (1910).
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laterally attacking a foreign divorce decree in a civil or criminal
proceeding initiated by it where both parties have appeared."
E. V. W., JR.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRESS AND RELIGION-EXcLUSION BY PROPERTY OWNER.-Plaintiffs, members of

the Jehovah's Witnesses sect, endeavor to interest people in their
tenets by means of leaflets which they distribute, either on the streets
or from door to door. They also disseminate their doctrines orally
or with the aid of portable phonographs. The defendant, the owner
of a housing project known as Parkchester, situated in the Bronx, in
New York City, pursuant to authority granted it in its leases with
its tenants, adopted a regulation prohibiting any person from entering any of its apartment buildings in order to solicit donations or contributions to any religious or other organization or to distribute
pamphlets or tracts without the consent of the manager of the development. Such activities were permitted in the apartment of any
tenant who gave his written consent. The plaintiffs attack this regulation as being an infringement upon their constitutional rights of
freedom of speech, of the press and of worship.1 The trial court
dismissed the complaint and held that the regulation was reasonable
and valid and not in violation of plaintiffs' rights. Held, dismissal
affirmed. The Bill of Rights does not proscribe the reasonable regulation by an owner of conduct inside his multiple dwelling. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, 297 N. Y. 339, 79 N. E. 2d 433 (1948).
The plaintiffs contend fhat door-to-door preaching and distribution of bible literature is protected by the Constitution,2 and such
protection extends to multiple as well as single dwellings.3 Therefore, argue the plaintiffs, this regulation is void, since it abridges
fundamental freedoms by expressly prohibiting such door-to-door
calls in Parkchester. In the cases cited by the plaintiffs to sustain
11 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in writing the majority opinion in the second
Williams case left the question, as to the right of a state to attack a foreign
divorce decree, rendered in a truly adversary proceeding, open. An answer
to that question was not necessary to the decision of the instant case, nor did
the court by way of dictum answer it, unless the holding that the Florida decree
is conclusive be deemed to preclude the state of Massachusetts as well as the
parties. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, by voicing a strong dissent on the ground
that the state should not be precluded, apparently felt that the question had
been answered.
2 U. S. CoNsr. AMENDS. I, XIV, § 1; NEW YORK Cosr~. Art. I, §§ 3, 8.
2 Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 87 L. ed.
1292 (1943) ; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 87 L. ed. 1313 (1943).
3Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 90 L. ed. 265 (1946);
Tucker v. State of Texas, 326 U. S. 517, 90 L. ed. 274 (1946); Hague v.
Comrpittee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 83 L. ed. 1423 (1939).

